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RESCUERS AND GOOD SAMARITANS*
ALLEN M. LINDEN*

In the past, tort law has displayed a reluctance to impose a duty to rescue or

to compensate rescuers injured during a rescue attempt Furthermore, tort

liability has been imposed upon would-be rescuers whose incompetence
has led to an abortive attempt. Professor Linden argues that this reluctance to

promote rescue is out-dated in a modern society which espouses humani
tarian ideals. The author examines Canadian and English jurisprudence to
demonstrate the recent recognition of the need to encourage and compensate

Good Samaritans. New tort duties to render aid, which have been fashioned

by analogy to criminal legislation, are analysed as well as the rescuer's duty
which arises once the rescue has been undertaken. Professor Linden also dis
cusses the applicability of the principle of voluntary assumption of risk to a res
cuer's claim for compensation for injuries sustained during the course of the res
cue. The author concludes by suggesting that the concept of contributory
negligence be used to dissuade rash rescue attempts in place of the current
judicial practice of complete denial of compensation.

Everyone admires a rescuer and a Good Samaritan. The common law,
however, in years gone by did not go out of its way to reward such
conduct. A rescuer injured while attempting to save someone in peril
used to be denied tort recovery. Someone who acted as a Good Sama
ritan might also be mulcted in damages if his effort was bungled.
At the same time, no one was obligated to render assistance, even
though he could do so without danger to himself. These principles
could hardly have encouraged altruism. Happily, in the last few years
tort law has begun to cast off these harsh ways. Rescuers now win
reparation if they are hurt offering succour to someone negligently im
perilled. The law has mollified its treatment of a deliverer whose effort
to assist another in danger goes awry. In some situations, a duty to
render aid is being established, where no such duty existed before.
The purpose of this article is to look at some of the developments in
this area of the law. The field is of special interest because the
Canadian courts have made a significant contribution in recent years
to the jurisprudence on the topic.
/. DUTY TO RESCUE
There is no general duty to assist anyone in peril. The law reports
contain some sickening examples of callous refusal to help, followed
by immunity from tort liability. For example, one need not lift a finger
to rescue a drowning man,1 nor issue a warning to someone who is
walking into a dangerous situation.2 A doctor is under no obligation
to attend a sick patient.3 According to our law we can stand by and
watch a man starve or bleed to death4 without incurring any legal
* Printed with the permission of the Modern Law Review.
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.

' Osterlind v. Hill (1928) 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301; Horsley v. MacLaren [1970] 2 O.R. 487 at 499 (per
Jessup J.A.).

2 Gautret v. Egerton (1867) L.R. 2 C.P. 371; Buch v. Amory Manufacturing Company (1897) 69 N.H. 257,
44 Ad. 809.

3 Hurley v. Edingfield (1901) 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058.
* Allen v. Hixson (1900) 111 Ga. 460, 36S.E. 810.
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liability. This is not merely cruelty for its own sake. The early courts
were hesitant to undertake the job of requiring people to help their
neighbors for their hands were full enough trying to prevent them from
attacking one another.5 The law tried to encourage and reflect a strong
sense of independence and individualism. It was considered a virtue
to mind one's own business and get along in the world without anybody
else's help.6 Moreover, the judges were dubious about trying to en
force unselfishness because this was too much an infringement of
personal freedom.7 Professor Ames has explained that underlying this
was the idea that the proper role of the common law was to prevent
people from harming one another, rather than to force them to confer
benefits on one another.8 Another reason behind this nonfeasance
principle was that it did not seem reasonable to force someone to throw
himself in the way of an armed attacker of a complete stranger and
risk injury or the loss of his life. The absence of any tort compensa
tion for rescuers injured while assisting someone in danger underscored
the wisdom of this view. There were also administrative reasons for
refusing to force people to rescue others. For example, it is rather
difficult to select which one of the many individuals on a crowded
beach should bear the responsibility to the man who drowns in full
view of them all. Moreover, there are difficulties in defining what
degree of danger someone is supposed to risk in order to help some
one else. Lastly, once somebody offers assistance, it is not easy to
decide how long he must continue to look after the bleeding stranger.9

All these matters have been impediments to development, but, happily,
our hearts have begun to conquer our brains and the law has started
to move in the direction of encouraging rescue. If someone negligently
creates a situation of peril, he is obligated to assist anyone injured as
a result' of his own conduct.10 Similarly, if one undertakes to help, he
is said to have assumed a duty.11 There are a group of special relations
where one must act for the benefit of another, as in the case of
carriers, innkeepers, bailees and perhaps shipmasters and store
keepers.12 The courts have found it easier to impose this duty here
because the person placed under the obligation normally derives some
economic advantage from the relationship.13
The courts have also indicated a willingness to describe conduct
as misfeasance rather than nonfeasance in certain specified instances.
In other words, liability is being imposed for affirmative acts of neg
ligence in creating a risk of danger rather than for mere failure to
act.

In Menow v. Honsberger and Jordan House Ltd.,u an intoxicated
patron of a bar was turned out of the hotel, which was situated near
5 See Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 334 (3d. ed. 1964) Fleming, The Law of Torts 145 (3d. ed.
1965). See generally Honore, Law, Morals and Rescue, in Ratcliffe, The Good Samaritan and The Law (1966).

■ See Harper & James, The Law of Torts 1046; (1956) Hale, Prima Facie Torts, Combination and Nonfeasance,
(1946) 46 Colum. L. Rev. 198 at 213; McNiece and Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, (1949) 58 Yale
LJ. 1272 at 1288.

1 Minor, Moral Obligation as a Basis of Liability. (1923) 9 Va. L. Rev. 421 at 422.
8 Ames, Law and Morals, (1908) 22 Harv. L. Rev. 97.
9 See generally Linden, Tort Liability for Criminal Nonfeasance, (1966) 44 Can. Bar Rev. 25 at 30 et seq..
10 Northern Central Ry Co. v. State (1868) 29 Md. 420.
11 See Prosser, supra, n. 5 at 336.

12 Id. 334; Arturburn, The Origin and First Test of Public Callings, (1927) 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 217.
13 Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, (1908) 56 U. Pa. L. Rev. 217.

14 [1970] 1 O.R. 54 (Ont H.C.) affirmed [1971] 1 O.R. 129 (C.A.). See also Hembler v. Todd (1970) 14 D.L.R. (3d) 637.
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a rather busy highway. As he walked along the road in his drunken
state, the plaintiff was injured by an automobile which was negligently
driven. The innkeeper was held partially at fault on the ground, inter
alia, that his employees "owed the plaintiff a common law duty of care
not to eject him if they knew or ought to have known that he would
thereby be placed in a position of danger to his personal safety."15
In reaching this decision, Mr. Justice Haines relied on a series of
cases in which common carriers were held liable for ejecting intoxi
cated passengers into situations of peril.16
There is another recent case in Manitoba, Oke v. Weide Transport
Ltd.,17 where similar reasoning was invoked. The defendant without
negligence collided with a metal traffic sign-post on the gravel strip
dividing two lanes of a highway. He left it bent over and projecting
at right angles, and did not report it to the authorities. The plaintiff
motorist, illegally using the median strip to pass another vehicle, was
fatally injured when he was impaled by this post. Although the majority
of the Manitoba Court of Appeal dismissed the action on the ground
of lack of foresight, Freedman J.A. argued that the defendant was not
in the same position as any other motorist with regard to the danger
ous sign-post. First, he had collided with the post, albeit without
negligence. Second, he was stopped by the sign and had an opportunity
to observe the hazard it created, while a passing motorist could do so
only fleetingly. Thirdly, he "participated in the creation of the hazard,"
recognized his obligation to do something and even took some steps
in that direction. The courts, therefore, are beginning to view conduct
that could be considered mere nonfeasance as misfeasance or creation
of risk.
Recently there has been an indication that the courts will rely upon
criminal legislation, not only to crystallize the standard of care, but
to fashion new tort duties to render aid. Most judges have done this
by relying on an intention theory, although most authors have attacked
them for it.18 One of the most celebrated instances of penal legislation
being invoked to establish a new tort duty is the case of Monk v.
Warbey.19 The defendant, Warbey, lent his vehicle to Knowles who in
turn permitted a third person, May, to use it. Warbey, the owner, was
himself insured against third party risks as required by a statute, but
neither Knowles nor May were so insured. May negligently injured
the plaintiff Monk, who sued Knowles, May and Warbey. Interlocutory
judgments were obtained against Knowles and May, but these people
were apparently penniless and the matter proceeded against Warbey
on the theory that his violation of the compulsory insurance legisla
tion gave the claimant a right to tort recovery. This view was adopted
by the trial judge, who was affirmed in the Court of Appeal. Lord
Justice Greer enunciated the principle as follows:20

11 W. at62.

18 Dunn v. Dominion Atlantic Ry Co. (1920) 60 S.C.R. 312, (1920) 52 D.L.R. 149; Howe v. Niagara, St. Catharines & Toronto Ry Co. (1925) 56 O.L.R. 202,11925] 2 D.L.R. 115.

" (1964) 41 D.L.R. (2d) 53. Cf. Millette v. Co. [1971] 2 O.R. 155 (Ont. H.C.), failure to keep road free of
ice and neglect by policeman to notify.
18 See Linden, supra, n. 9 at 35 et seq.

19 [1935] 1 K.B. 75.
» 7tf.at81.
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Prima facie a person who has been injured by the breach of statute has a right to
recover damages from the person committing it, unless it can be established by
considering the whole of the act that no such right was intended to be given. So
far as that being shown in this case, the contrary is established.

Two of the judges relied on subsection 4 of the legislation, which
permitted a money deposit instead of securing insurance, as evidence

of a legislative intention to confer civil rights.
I suggest, however, that the real reason for this decision was not
the interpretation exercise engaged in by the court. If Parliament had

really intended this result it could have so specified in the statute,
as it has done on occasion. Rather the court wished to advance the
policy of the legislation by providing compensation to those injured in
auto accidents. There is support for this view in the language of the
judges. Lord Justice Greer felt that the criminal sanction was in
adequate to assist someone injured by an uninsured driver if a
civil remedy were not available. His Lordship stated that "To prosecute
for a penalty is no sufficient protection and is poor consolation to the
injured person, though it affords a reason why persons should not
commit a breach of the statute."21 Lord Justice Maugham described
the purpose of the statute as that of "giving a remedy to third persons

who might suffer injury by the negligence of an impecunious driver
of a car... ."22 He stated further that car accidents and injuries to
third persons were so common that "it was necessary in the public
interest to provide machinery whereby those third persons might re
cover damages." This decision has been attacked by several learned
authors. Glanville Williams described the decision as "an improper
type of judicial invention."23 Professor Fleming contended that it was
"difficult to justify on any account," that it was a "most blatant
arrogation of legislative authority" and that it was an example of
judicial discretion being stretched "beyond... legitimate bounds."24
And, yet, if the theory of legislative intention can be invoked to fix
a standard of care for reasonable men to obey, it should, logically, be
available to courts who wish to create a new tort duty to act. In both
situations, the courts are being less than frank when they tell us that they
have found a legislative intention, when, in fact, none has been expres
sed in the enactment. Despite these attacks, Monk v. Warbey is now
well-established in the law and has even received the ratification of
the House of Lords in McLeod (Houston) v. Buchanan,25 where Lord
Wright argued that "the provision is an important element in the
policy of the legislature to secure the benefit of insurance for sufferers
of road accidents."

Another area where tort responsibility by analogy to the criminal
law has been recognized is hit-and-run accidents. Penal legislation
everywhere orders those involved in an automobile accident to stop,
give their name and address and render whatever assistance is re
quired.26 Many American courts have held violators of this type of
legislation civilly liable where additional damages have resulted to
Jl Id.

» Id. at 86.

M The Effect of Penal Legislation in The Law of Torts, (1960) 23 Mod. L. Rev. 233.
" Supra, n. 5 at 130, and the 2nd ed. 1961 at 134.

** [1940] 2 All E.R. 179 at 186.
n E.g., The Highway Traffic Act, R.S.0.1960, c. 172, s. 143a.
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those injured because of their refusal to offer succour. There is very
little discussion in the cases about why the courts have done this.
In some of the cases the language to this effect is merely obiter dicta.
Nevertheless, it seems well-entrenched in the law. The leading case
is probably Brooks v. E. J. Willig Transport Company,27 where the
Supreme Court of California upheld a statement in the charge to the
jury to the effect that knowingly to refuse to stop after an accident
was a breach of a civil duty which did not depend upon the negligence
of the driver nor on the freedom from contributory negligence by the
victim. The court stated the principle as follows:28
One who negligently injures another and renders him helpless is bound to use

reasonable care to prevent any further harm which the actor realizes or should
realize threatens the injured person. This duty existed at common law, although
the accident was caused in part by the negligence of the person who was injured
.... The legislation requires... an automobile driver who injures another to stop
and render aid. This duty is imposed upon the driver whether or not he is respon
sible for the accident, and a violation gives rise to civil liability if it is a proxi
mate cause of further injury or death.

The court did not give us the policy reasons which motivated it
to adopt this rule and did not even cite an earlier case to the
same effect in the same state.29 Nevertheless, this case has been
followed in other states. While it does not appear to have been in
voked yet in the Commonwealth, there is no reason to doubt that it
would be if the opportunity presented itself.
Even though the courts have not stated why they have used hitand-run statutes in this way, one might make some intelligent guesses
about this. The civil courts are helping the legislatures to encourage
Good Samaritanism on the highways where thousands are killed and
injured each year. It may be that by imposing civil liability as well as
penal sanctions the courts can further reduce the incidence of hit-andrun violations. The courts have not disguised the moral repugnance
they feel toward those who hit and run; they have permitted evidence
of a breach of a hit-and-run statute to be used as proof of negligence
in the original accident and they have awarded punitive damages in
some of these cases.30 Since automobile insurance is prevalent in these
cases, the courts are able to act as loss distributors as well as loss
shifters. The absence of many of the administrative problems generally
associated with these Good Samaritan cases has facilitated the develop
ment. The defendant has been singled out by becoming involved in
an accident. There is seldom any danger to him in rendering assistance,
because all he need do in most cases is telephone for an ambulance
or help redirect traffic. There is every reason to believe that these
cases will attract support in the years ahead and will form another
large exception to the no liability for nonfeasance rule.

This theory of tort liability based upon violation of criminal statute
has recently been given a lift by the Ontario Court of Appeal in the
case of Horsley v. MacLaren.31 The defendant, MacLaren, owned a
17 (1953) 40 Cal. (2d) 669, 255 P. <2d) 802.
» Id. at 808-809.
» Summers v. Dominguez (1938) 29 Cal. App. <2d) 308,84 P. (2d) 237 (D.C.A.).

30 See Battle v. Kilcrease (1936) 54 Ga. App. 808, 189 S.E. 573; Hallman v. Cushman (1941) 196 S.C. 402,
13 S.E. (2d) 498.
11 [1970] 2 O.R. 487 (C.A.); See Linden, Comment (1970) 48 Can. Bar Rev. 541.
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cabin cruiser, upon which he took some friends for a cruise one cool,
spring day. Brisk winds came up and made the Lake Ontario water
choppy, driving most of the passengers below. Matthews remained on
the deck, but he soon got up and proceeded toward the stern of the
boat. For no apparent reason, he lost his footing and toppled over into
the forty-four degree Farenheit water. A passenger snouted "Holy's
overboard." MacLaren threw the boat into neutral and the pas
sengers scrambled up to the deck. MacLaren then reversed the motors
and backed up to where Matthews had been seen, forty to fifty feet
astern. The engines were shut off and the boat drifted towards
Matthews. A life ring and a life jacket were thrown into the water
by a passenger, while another tried to hook Matthews with a pikepole.
Matthews made no attempt to assist himself, but merely floated with
outstretched arms, his eyes open and glassy, apparently unconscious.
As the boat began to drift away, McLaren started the engines again
and backed up the boat toward Matthews once more. After a few
minutes had elapsed, Horsley, one of the passengers removed his
clothing and dove into the icy water emerging about ten feet from
Matthews. Mrs. Jones, another passenger, noticing Matthews' body
fall forward into the water, also leaped in to help, but could not
prevent Matthews' body from going under the starboard quarter of the
boat. Mr. Jones, upon seeing his wife in the water, took over the
controls of the boat and swung it around, approaching his wife "bow
on" and pulled her aboard safely. MacLaren again resumed control of
the boat and picked up Horsley, but he could not be resuscitated, having
died from cardiac failure as a result of the sudden shock from being
immersed in the cold water. The body of Matthews was never recovered
and, therefore, the exact cause of death remained unknown, but it
was believed that he also died of a heart attack.
At the trial, Matthews' family was denied recovery on the ground
that there was no evidence of causal relation between his death and
MacLaren's conduct. Horsley's family, however, was successful. On
an appeal by the defendant, the Ontario Court of Appeal reversed
the decision and dismissed Horsley's action as well.

Mr. Justice Lacourciere, at the trial,32 expanded the "quasi-contrac
tual" duty of the carrier to his passenger so that it would apply to the
master of a pleasure boat and his invited guest. His Lordship relied
in part upon the Canada Shipping Act, which imposes a criminal fine
upon a master of a vessel who fails to "render assistance to every
person... who is found at sea and in danger of being lost... ." His
Lordship stated that:33
Parliament reflecting the conscience of the community has seen fit to impose on

the master a duty to render assistance to any stranger, including an enemy alien

'found at sea and in danger of being lost...;' the common law can be no less
solicitous for the safety of an invited guest and must impose upon the master the
duty to attempt a rescue, when this can be done without imperilling the safety of
the vessel, her crew and passengers. The common law must keep pace with the de
mands and expectations of a civilized community, the sense of social obligation,
and brand as tortious negligence the failure to help a man overboard in accordance
with the universal custom of the sea.

32 (1969J2O.R.137.

M Id. at 143.
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The Court of Appeal, while reversing the decision of the trial judge,
did not interfere with his reasoning on this point. Mr. Justice Jessup
argued that the Canada Shipping Act covered not only strangers "found
at sea" hut also passengers. He declared that he was unable to
"adopt... an interpretation which would ascribe to Parliament a
solicitude for the lives of alien enemies at the same time denied by
it to passengers and crews of Canadian ships."34 He concluded by say
ing that the Canada Shipping Act "on one or the other of the legal
theories by which the courts attach civil consequences to the breach of
a penal provision in a statute will support a cause of action... ."
His Lordship also agreed with Mr. Justice Lacourciere's imposition of
a duty of care upon a master of a ship to his passenger who falls
overboard:35
A passenger on a ship is in the position of total dependence on the master and I
think that peculiar relationship must now be recognized as invoking a duty of the
master, incident to the duty to use due care in the carriage by sea of a passenger,
of aid against the perils of the sea. Falling overboard is such a peril, and in that
situation I do not think that the common law can do otherwise than to adopt the
statutory duty to render assistance.

Mr. Justice Schroeder (MacGillivray J.A. concurring), was slightly
more cautious in articulating his reasons for decision. He denied that
the breach of a statute could "create" a legal duty to rescue. Never
theless, he asserted that:36
...Parliament, in enacting this section, gave expression to humanitarian principles,
which should guide the consciences of civilized men in their relations even to an
enemy who was found in peril at sea, and this must have an important bearing
on the question as to whether a moral or social duty... can be ripened into a legal
duty not only to come to his passenger's aid, but also to exercise reasonable care
in the rescue procedure.

Mr. Justice Schroeder's language indicates that
need for tort law to follow the criminal law by
duties based on these penal statutes. This case is
to the Supreme Court of Canada and it is to be
lend its support to this view.

he recognizes the
creating new tort
now under appeal
hoped that it will

There is every expectation that this theory will be favourably
received by Mr. Justice Laskin, who has recently been appointed to
the Supreme Court, because he has already expressed his support
for it in Colonial Coach Lines v. Bennet and C.P.R.37 In that case the
plaintiffs bus was damaged when it collided with a cow that escaped
from a farmer's land onto the highway through a defective fence
along the railway's right of way. In holding the railway partially
responsible to the plaintiff, Mr. Justice Laskin relied on two sections
of the Railway Act of Canada. Section 277 created an obligation to
erect fences "suitable to prevent cattle... from getting on the railway
lands." Section 392 imposed a civil liability for failing to do so, if the
loss occurred on "railway lands." Mr. Justice Laskin reasoned as
follows:38
3t (1970) 2 O.R. 487 at 500.
35 Id. at 501.
34 Id. at 492.

35 (1968) 66 D.L.R. (2d) 396 (Ont C.A.).
31 Id. at 403.
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[Although] the railway's strict liability under section 392 extends generally to in

jury on the railway right of way arising from a failure to fence, it may incur lia
bility beyond this scope for injury off the right of way which, by reason of what
it knew or ought to have known, could reasonably be foreseen as likely to occur if
it failed to keep in repair a fence known to it to be defective. This liability for
negligence is not founded merely on breach of a statutory duty to fence, but pro
ceeds on a footing of a state of facts comprehending maintenance of a fence to
prevent the escape, from the adjoining land, of cattle which, if not contained,
might stray on to a highway open from the right of way and expose oncoming
traffic to the risk of injury. The triggering elements of liability are the railway's
awareness of the defective condition of the fence and failure to take immediate
measures to avert injury, which could be reasonably foreseen. Existence of a
statutory obligation to fence and actual assumption thereof by the railway were
simply factors in the raising of a duty of care to the plaintiff by the railway when
it knew that the obligation had not been met.

Perhaps the farthest any court has gone on the basis of this theory
was in Menow v. Honsberger & Jordan House Ltd.39 In that case the
hotel owner, inter alia, violated Ontario legislation which forbade the
selling of liquor to intoxicated people. Mr. Justice Haines held that
these provisions "were enacted not only to protect society generally,
but also to provide some safeguard for persons who might become
irresponsible and place themselves in a position of danger... ." His
Lordship then concluded that "by committing this unlawful act, the
corporate defendant has not only committed an offence... but it has
breached a common law duty to the plaintiff..." because "... it may
be inferred that the legislators intended to provide for tort liabili
ty... ." Penal legislation, therefore, is a factor that courts will consider
in determining whether they will fashion a new tort duty. They are
moving by analogy to penal legislation in the imposition of civil lia
bility by creating novel civil duties of care that correspond to duties
laid down in criminal legislation.

There are some cases, however, where the courts have refused to
do so. The reason most commonly given in these situations is that the
statute evinced no intention to create tort liability. It is suggested,
however, that there is no more and no less legislative intention visible
here than in the other cases. For example, in the Commerford case,40
a municipal by-law required abutters to clean ice and snow from ad
joining sidewalks. The defendant breached the statute and the plain
tiff was injured when he slipped on the ice. The court decided that no
civil liability was created by this violation of statute because there was
no intention to this effect in the by-law. In support, the court pointed
to other provisions that enacted civil liability for the breach of certain
sections, it stated that no specific power had been given to the muni
cipality to provide for tort liability and argued that the small penalty
evinced a legislative benevolence toward homeowners. This decision is
typical of many in the United States to the same effect.41 The real
reason for this decision, however, is not intention. Rather, the courts
distrust these inferior law-making bodies and are unwilling to advance
their legislative policies. Moreover, the policy of these by-laws is a harsh
one in that it transfers the burden of road care from the municipali
ties to neighbouring landowners. To saddle such landowners with a
39 Supra, n. 14.
40 [1950] 2 D.L.R. 207 (N.S.S.C.).

" See e.g., Willis v. Parker (1919) 225 N.Y. 159,121 N.E. 8iO.
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civil obligation as well as the penal duty to tend the sidewalks is just
going too far. The failure of the courts to hold liable a race-track owner
for failing to provide space to a book-maker contrary to a statute can
also be supported on the ground that the policy of the statute was not
worthy of expansion, although the court stated that the penalties were
"effective sanctions" and stood "in no need of aid from civil proceed
ings."42 Lord Simonds gave a clue to his thinking when he declared
that "the statute was not the charter of the bookmakers."43

//. DUTY OF THE RESCUER

Once someone undertakes a rescue, he not only risks injury to him
self, but he may be responsible in tort to the person he tries to rescue,
if the effort is bungled. Fortunately, there are not very many cases of
actions against Good Samaritans, but there are a few that have been
successful. For example, in Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros.,44 the deceased was
taken ill in the defendant's store. The defendant undertook to render
medical aid and kept her in its infirmary without any medical care for
six hours. The court felt that by segregating the plaintiff it was made
impossible for another bystander to summon an ambulance. Mr.
Justice Lauer of the Supreme Court of New York stated that "if a

defendant undertakes a task, even if under no duty to undertake it,
the defendant must not omit to do what an ordinary man would do in
performing the task." This case has been relied on for the proposi
tion that once one undertakes to assist someone in peril, he must
exercise reasonable care and will be responsible for failing to do so.
Such a rule would be rather hard on the well-meaning rescuer and
might tend to discourage potential Good Samaritans. Often doctors
give this rule as a reason for not stopping at the scene of an auto
mobile accident.

This interpretation may be inaccurate, however, in the light of the
case of East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v. Kent.45 In that case,
a public authority began to fix a damaged sea wall that had permit
ted the plaintiffs land to be flooded. It delayed in doing the work
so that the defendant's land was submerged for a much longer period
than it would have been had they done the work properly. The defen
dant agency, was, nevertheless, relieved of liability on the ground
that it had exercised its discretion in an acceptable way. Despite the
fact that the plaintiff was not well-served, his position was not wor
sened by their actions. The court was unwilling to place any stringent
obligations upon the public authority for fear that it would avoid
undertaking assistance altogether. Most of these cases involved public
authorities and municipalities.46 As a result, it was thought that this
principle was limited to such bodies.47
" Cutler v. Wandsworth Stadium 11949J A.C. 398.
" Id. at 404.

" (1935) 287 N.Y.S. 134. See also Harriett v. Chelsea and Kensington Hospital 11968] 1 All E.R. 1068 (Q.B.D.)
(dictum).

"■ [1941] A.C. 74.

46 Stevens-Willson v. Chatham [1933] O.R. 305 affirmed [1934] S.C.R. 353; Sheppard v. Glossop Corpora
tion [1921] 3 K.B. 132. See Friedmann, Statutory Powers and Legal Duties of Local Authorities, (1945) 8 Mod.
L. Rev. 31.

J

47 Fleming, supra, n. 5 at 148.
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However, the case of Horsley v. MacLaren48 has indicated that this
doctrine may have a broader application. It will be recalled that, when
the plaintiff, Matthews, fell overboard, the defendant undertook to rescue
him by backing up towards him. The evidence was that this was the
wrong procedure. Mr. Justice Lacourciere, at trial, exacted the usual
standard of reasonable care from the rescuer. He asked "What would
the reasonable boat operator do in the circumstances... ?" Because
the defendant used the "wrong procedure" in backing the boat up and
because of his "excessive consumption of alcohol," he held that there
was negligence.49
The Court of Appeal, however, felt that there was only an error
in judgment which did not amount to negligence. Mr. Justice Jessup
relied upon the East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v. Kent case and
adopted its test. He contended that:50
...where a person gratuitously and without any duty to do so undertakes to con
fer a benefit upon or go to the aid of another, he incurs no liability unless what
he does worsens the condition of that other.

Mr. Justice Jessup rejected the rationale used by the trial judge and
argued:51
I think it is an unfortunate development in the law which leaves the Good Samari
tan liable to be mulcted in damages, and apparently in the United States, it is one
that has produced marked reluctance of doctors to aid victims.

Mr. Justice Schroeder echoed this view and argued that:52
...if a person embarks upon a rescue, and does not carry it through, he is not
under any liability to the person to whose aid he has come so long as discon
tinuance of his efforts did not leave the other in a worse condition that when he
took charge.

Since MacLaren's rescue effort had not worsened Matthews' position,
even though it may not have complied with the standard of "text
book perfection", he was relieved of responsibility.

The purpose of this rule is to encourage potential rescuers by re
ducing the risk of liability to them if their effort is unsuccessful.

This is a wise policy so long as it does not foster careless rescue opera

tions. It is possible to mismanage a rescue attempt horribly and yet
not worsen the position of the already doomed man. The law must
fashion a rule that does not inhibit would-be rescuers and yet does not
invite well-meaning bunglers to interfere. A preferable approach might
be the one pioneered in the United States. Over thirty American
jurisdictions have enacted legislation relieving doctors and nurses and,
on some occasions, ordinary citizens from tort liability for their con
duct at the scene of an accident, except if they are guilty of gross
negligence.53 The Province of Alberta has also enacted such a statute.
The Emergency Medical Aid Act states:54

3. Where, in respect of a person who is ill, injured or unconscious as the result
of an accident or other emergency,

'" 1197O| 2 O.R. 487 (C.A.), reversing [1969] t O.R. 137.
•» [1969] 2 O.R. 137 at 145-146.
50 [1970] 2 O.R. 487 at 500.
51 Id. at 502.
M Id. at 495.

53 Louisell & Williams, The Trial of Medical Malpractice Cases s.594.2 (1960).
M S.A. 1969, c.28, s.3.
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(a) a physician or registered nurse voluntarily and without expectation of com
pensation or reward renders emefgency medical services or first aid assistance

and the services or assistance are not rendered at a hospital or other place
having adequate medical facilities and equipment, or

(b) a person other than a person mentioned in clause (a) voluntarily renders
emergency first aid assistance and that assistance is rendered at the immediate
scene of the accident or emergency,

the physician, registered nurse or other person is not liable for damages for injuries
to or the death of that person alleged to have been caused by an act or omission
on his part in rendering the medical services or first. aid assistance, unless it is
established that the injuries or death were caused by gross negligence on his part.

Such an approach retains some control over the conduct of res
cuers while at the same time it does not frighten them away. Al
though one might quarrel with some of the conditions in the statute
such as the necessity to rescue "without expectation of compensation,"
its general thrust is welcome. It is hard to tell whether it will really
increase the frequency of rescue efforts, but at least the excuse of
fear of liability will be unavailable to Bad Samaritans in the future.
III. DUTY TO THE RESCUER

Many years ago rescuers were denied tort recovery on the ground
that they had voluntarily assumed the risk of injury or on the ground
that the defendant was not the cause of their loss. Such a case was
that of Anderson v. Northern Railway of Canada5* where the plain
tiff leaped in front of a train to try to save a woman and was killed.
The case was dismissed on a split decision in the Court of Appeal
because the cause of the injury to the deceased was his own conduct.
In the intermediate Court of Appeal, admiration was expressed for
the defendant's "gallant self-sacrifice", but the court held that the
injury was "self-sought" and "self-caused".56 Another example of
such a case was Kimball v. Butler Bros.57 where the volunteer theory
was invoked to deny compensation to the family of the deceased who
had suffocated during a rescue attempt when a fire broke out in the
Detroit tunnel as it was being built. Because the rescuer was acting
"solely as a volunteer" and with a "full comprehension of danger",
the court refused to impose liability.58
Perhaps the earliest case that granted any tort compensation to a
rescuer was a 1910 Manitoba decision, Seymour v. Winnipeg Elec
tric Railway.59 On a demurrer it was held, contrary to the Anderson
case, that a rescuer could recover from a negligent wrongdoer. Mr.
Justice Richards, after recognizing that "the promptings of humanity
towards the saving of life are amongst the noblest instincts of man
kind,"60 concluded that:61

... the trend of modern legal thought is toward holding that those who risk their
safety in attempting to rescue others who are put in peril by the negligence of
third persons are entitled to claim such compensation from such third persons for
injuries they may receive in such attempts.
"(1876)25U.C.C.P.3O1.
M Id. at 307.
57 (1910) 15 O.W.R. 221 (C.A.).

"* Id. at 222.
59 (1910) 13 W.L.R. 566 (Man. C.A.).
so Id. at 568.

•" Id.
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It is strange that twenty-three years after this case was decided
the English courts were still struggling with the concepts of causa
tion and volenti in dealing with the problem of rescue. For example,
in Cutler v. United Dairies62 the plaintiff was injured while holding
the head of a runaway horse in response to the driver's call for help.
Although the jury found for the plaintiff, the action was dismissed
on appeal. The court reasoned that "the damage must be on his own
head" and also that "a new cause has intervened."63 Mr. Justice
Slesser argued that in some cases where somebody dashes out to save
someone in danger recovery might be available because there is no
novus actus interveniens. His Lordship continued, however, by con
cluding that although the act was "heroic and laudable" it cannot be
said that it was "not in the legal sense the cause of the accident."64

In another English case, Brandon v. Osborne Garreit and Co.,65 the

problem was avoided when Mr. Justice Swift described as "instinctive"
the rescue act of a wife who tried to pull her husband away from
glass falling from a skylight. These little distinctions about causa
tion and about whether the rescue was instinctive or deliberate did
not add very much to our understanding of the law nor did they assist
in the solution of these cases.
It took the great American judge, Mr. Justice Cardozo, to finally
set this matter to rest. In one of the most beautifully written passages
in any tort case, Mr Justice Cardozo stated the principle in Wagner
v. International Railway Company 66 as follows:
Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The law does
not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct to its consequences. It
recognizes them as normal. It places their effects within the range of the natural
and probable. The wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the imperilled victim;
it is a wrong also to his rescuer. The risk of rescue, if only it be not wanton,
is born of the occasion. The emergency begets the man. The wrongdoer may not
have foreseen the coming of a deliverer. He is accountable as if he had.

In 1938 the English courts finally succumbed to the Canadian and
American lead and granted recovery to the rescuer. In Haynes v.
Harwood67 a police constable tried to push a woman out of the way
of a runaway horse and was injured in the attempt. The court dis
tinguished Cutler on the ground that "nobody was in any danger" there
and that a policeman was "expected" to help those in danger. The
decision for the plaintiff was affirmed by the Court of Appeal and Lord
Justice Greer justified the decision as follows: "It would be a little
surprising if a rational system of law... denied any remedy to a
brave man."68 Lord Justice Maugham indicated that the problem was
not as simple as it might first appear. It is necessary to balance the
interests which are sought to be protected and the other interests
involved. In other words, one must take into account the degree of
danger and the probable response of the rescuer.
« 11933) 2 K.B. 297 (C.A.). See Goodhart, Rescue and Voluntary Assumption of Risk, (1934) 5 Camb. L. J. 192.
*■' Cutler v. United Dairies, supra, n. 62 at 303.
61 Id. at 306.

65 [1924) 1 K.B. 548.
" (1921) 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437.
"; [1934J 2 K.B. 240, affirmed [1935J1 K.B. 146.

»• Id. at 152.
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Since the breakthrough of Haynes v. Harwood the courts of the
Commonwealth have showered much attention upon the rescuer.
In Videan v. British Transport Commission,69 for example, the duty
to the rescuer was extended to cover a rescuer of an "unforseeable"
trespasser. A child trespassed on a railway and an employee of the
railway rushed to save him from being run over by a train and was
injured in the attempt. The court denied the child compensation on
the ground that he was a trespasser, whereas it granted recompense
to the rescuer. Although two of the judges did so on the ground that
the rescuer, as an employee of the railway, was owed a special duty
of care, Lord Justice Denning based his decision on the ground that
the rescuer was foreseeable while the trespasser was not! Lord Den
ning alluded to the desire of the common law to encourage rescue in
these words: "Whoever comes to the rescue, the law should see that
he does not suffer for it."70 The protection of the rescuer has been
extended a long way. Similarly, someone who suffered anxiety neurosis
after he helped in a rescue operation after a train wreck was per
mitted to recover tort damages in circumstances where they probably
would have been denied to an ordinary by-stander.71
A person is not only liable to those injured while rescuing third
persons that he places in danger, but, if he gets himself into trouble,
he owes a duty to someone who comes to his aid. Although there was
some early authority to the contrary,72 a plea to extend the "humani
tarian doctrine of rescue", by the late Dean Cecil A. Wright73 was
heeded because "as between a careless man and the heroic rescuer
the policy of the law favours shifting the loss from the latter to the
former." Although fault to the third person is the usual situation,
Dean Wright urged that "fault with respect to oneself should also
suffice." In Baker v. Hopkins,74 this theory was adopted by Mr.
Justice Barry at trial who disapproved of the Dupuis case and stated
that, although no one has a duty to preserve his own safety, "if by
his own carelessness a man puts himself into a position of peril, of
a kind that invites rescue, he would in the law be liable for any in
jury caused to someone whom he ought to have foreseen would
attempt to come to his aid."75 This case was upheld on appeal, but
the court did not refer specifically to this point. The Australian courts
in Chapman v. Hearse76 have also accepted this principle. In that
case, Dr. Chapman was killed when a negligent motorist collided with
him while he was helping someone on the highway who was injured
because of his own negligence. Dr. Chapman's family brought action
against the motorist, who added the careless person being helped,
as a third party. The court, without mentioning either the Dupuis
case or the Baker case, held the person being rescued by Dr. Chap
man twenty-five per cent responsible and stated that if support was
necessary, "ample can be found in the analogous rescue cases."
«» [1963] 2 All E.R. 860 (C.A.). For a discussion of this case see Tiley. The Rescue Principle, (1967) 30 Mod.
L. Rev. 25.
70 Id. at 868.

71 Chadwick v. British Transport Commission [1967] 2 All E.R. 445 (K.B.D.).

rt Dupuis v. New Kegina Trading Co. Ltd. [1943] 4 D.L.R. 275.
73 (1943) 21 Can. Bar Rev. 758 at 763, 764, and 765.
71 11958) 3 All E.R. 147 (Q.B.D.), affirmed [1959] I W.L.R. 966.

7J Id. at 153.

79 11961] S.A.S.R. 51, a/7iiwrf (1961) 106C.L.R. 112.
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It should be noted here that the person being rescued was held re
sponsible in part for the act of someone who negligently injured the
rescuer as he was participating in the act of rescue.

Although the courts were slow in doing so, they have awarded
tort damages for personal injuries even to rescuers of property. The
Supreme Court of Canada, for example, in Connel v. Prescott71 recog
nized that someone hurt attempting to protect endangered horses
could recover from the person who negligently put the horses in peril.
Similarly, in Hutterly v. Imperial Oil,78 the plaintiff attempted to
drive his car out of a burning garage and was injured in the attempt.
Liability was imposed upon the defendant, both for the damage to the
car and for the personal injury to the plaintiff, despite the fact that
he could easily have escaped himself without being injured, on the
ground that his attempt to save his property was not unreasonable.
People who are burned while helping to put out fires are also
awarded tort compensation.79 In addition to losses for personal in
juries suffered during attempts to save property, the courts will
compensate for loss to property incurred during such an attempt.
In the case of Thorn v. James,80 a servant tried to prevent one of
his employer's machines being destroyed in a fire by hooking some
horses to it and pulling it free. He failed in his attempt and the horses
were burned. The original negligent defendant was made responsible
to pay for the horses because the rescue effort was said to have been
reasonable in the circumstances.
IV. THE CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT RESCUER
The common law does not protect every single rescuer no matter
how foolish his attempt may be; there must be some reasonably
perceived danger to a person or goods and the conduct of the rescuer
must be reasonable in the circumstances. This does not mean, of course,
that a claimant Good Samaritan must establish that there was actual
danger. Nor does it mean that the rescuer must act in a perfect way.

There were some early authorities that seemed to demand proof
of actual danger before a rescuer could be entitled to recover,81 but
they were too harsh and served to impede rather than to reward
rescue attempts. This is no longer the case. All that is required now

is a reasonable belief that somebody is in peril. For example, a claim
ant may recover damages even if the person being "rescued" is
already dead, but this is not known.82 In Ould v. Buttler's Wharf83
a rescuer wrongly believed that a fellow workman was in danger of
being hit by the hook of a crane. He tried to push him out of the
way, but, as he did so, the imperilled man dropped the case of rubber
that he was carrying onto the rescuer's foot. Mr. Justice Gorman held
for the rescuer even though he was wrong in his assessment of the
danger, because he felt that there was an "imminent serious acci
dent." A futile rescue attempt may, consequently, be compensated
;; (1892) 2 O.A.R. 49, affirmed 22 S.C.R. 147.
n [1956] 3 D.L.R. <2d) 719.
n Russel v. McCabe [1962] N.Z.L.R. 392; Hyett v. G. W. Ry. [ 1948] 1 K.B. 345 (CA.).
"° (1903) 14 Man. R. 373.

8' McDonald v. Burr [1919] 3 W.W.R. 825 (Sask. C.A.); Brine v. Dubbin [1933] 2 W.W.R. 25 (Alta. S.C.).
n Wagner v. International Railway (1921) 232 N.Y. 176,133 N.E. 437.
M (1953) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 44.
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with tort damages if it is a reasonable one. This is understandable
because it is often difficult to know in advance if a rescue effort
will yield positive results as where children are lost in the woods or
where miners are buried in a mine. If there is a reasonable chance
of saving life or avoiding injury, the common law cannot deny recovery
to those hurt during these attempts for fear that they may be dis
couraged from their heroic acts.
In addition to the need for a reasonable perception of danger, the
response of the rescuer must be a reasonable one. For example, if
somebody jumps off the Peace Tower to rescue a little child on the
road and is killed in the process, he ought not to be compensated.
The courts have justified this conclusion by holding that the rescuer
was either "foolhardy",84 "rash",85 or "needlessly reckless"86 and,
therefore, the rescue attempt was not foreseeable and no duty was
owed. This approach is in my view unsatisfactory because it limits
the right to recover more than is necessary to achieve the purpose of
dissuading foolish rescue attempts. Tort law seeks to encourage men
to help one another but not to do so foolishly. The courts are, there
fore, correct in refusing to make the original wrongdoer pay for
the losses of the stupid rescuer. By denying him compensation, it seeks
to diminish the frequency of unwise rescue efforts. But the test of foolhardiness is inadequate because it is too blunt an instrument. A
more delicate tool would be preferable. Comparative negligence is a
more flexible device, but there is little evidence of it being used to
date. In fact, there is authority to the effect that contributorily negli
gent rescuers cannot recover at all. For example, in the Brandon
case,87 the court indicated that if a rescuer "did something a reason
able person ought not to have done," he will be denied recovery. Now,
this may have been acceptable, prior to the legislation that permits
us to split responsibility, because both foolhardy rescue attempts
and negligent ones would yield precisely the same result. Today, how
ever, there are several different results that might be achieved if
comparative negligence were used. For example, an utterly hopeless
and ridiculous rescue effort can still be held to be outside the duty
of care of the original defendant because it is unforeseeable. Some
rescue attempts, however, may not be intelligently executed and yet
may not be utterly devoid of some merit. There is no reason why a
reduced award cannot be granted to the rescuer which would give
him something for his heroism without ignoring the fact that he was
less than careful.
The ordinary tort principles should obtain here and in the case of
Sayers v. Harlow Urban District Council68 there is some support for
this view. A lady was trapped in a public lavatory through the negli
gence of the defendant and was injured while trying to climb out of
it. In order to avoid coming to the conclusion that there was no duty
owed the plaintiff, who was a kind of "self-rescuer", the court found
that she was not guilty of conduct that was "unwise or imprudent
" Supra, n. 74 at 153 (Q.B.D.).
" Haigh v. Grand Trunk (1914) 7 W.W.R. 806 (Alta. S.C.).
•« Supra, n. 59 at 571.
" U92411 K.B. 548 at 552.

M 11958] 2 All E.R. 342 (C.A.).
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or rash or stupid." And, yet, the court went on to hold that the plain
tiff "cannot entirely be absolved from some measure of fault," and
deprived her of one quarter of her damages. This conclusion makes
sense and there is reason to believe that the same result could be
achieved with the ordinary rescuer as well as with the person who
is saving himself. In Baker v. Hopkins89 the court permitted the
doctor rescuer to recover in full as he was held not to be "foolhardy"
and yet it might have been wiser to reduce his recovery in the cir
cumstances. Horsley v. MacLaren90dea\t with these problems as well.

The trial judge, Mr. Justice Lacourciere, clearly expressed the rules
for the protection of rescuers. He felt that the conduct of Horsley, who
leaped in to help the person who had originally fallen in, was not
"futile, reckless, rash, wanton or foolhardy," nor was he guilty
of contributory negligence. His Lordship did not think it mattered that
the person being rescued could not have been helped. Volenti was
rejected because it was not pleaded and because there was no free and
voluntary assumption of the risk. Mr. Justice Lacourciere concluded
that the rescuer was "within the risk created by the defendant's
negligent conduct."

The Court of Appeal reversed, withholding compensation to Horsley.
Mr. Justice Jessup did agree that a rescue attempt by a passenger is
generally foreseeable in a situation of a mishandled rescue attempt.
Nevertheless, he held that this particular rescuer could not reasonably
have been anticipated because he had been warned to remain in the
cabin because of his inexperience with boating. "By that command
...", said Mr. Justice Jessup, "MacLaren insulated Horsley from such
perils of the voyage as were eventually encountered... ."91
Mr. Justice Schroeder circumscribed even further the protection
afforded to rescuers by listing the factual circumstances which made
the rescue attempt unforeseeable: the temperature of the water, the
continuing efforts of the other people at rescue, the inability of
Horsley to judge whether what was being done was reasonable, the
order of MacLaren to Horsley to keep himself in the cabin, Horsley's
failure to tell the skipper that he was going to dive into the water,
the lack of precautions Horsley took in not donning a life jacket
or attaching a rope to himself, particularly in circumstances where he
saw the effect of the cold water upon Matthews.92 In other words,
according to Mr. Justice Schroeder, the need for Horsley's rescue
attempt was doubtful and his conduct of it was substandard. The
trouble is that the Court of Appeal, therefore, went on to deny com
pensation altogether on the basis of lack of foresight and absence
of duty.

This is unfortunate and wrong. The court should have held that
such a rescue attempt was foreseeable, even in these bizarre circum

stances, since it is not necessary to foresee the details of the way
in which a rescue will be tried.93 It should have held that the acts

89 Supra, n. 74.
90 Supra, n. 50.

91 Id. at 502.
92 Id. at 496.

93 Hughes v. Lord Advocate [1963] A.C. 837. See Linden, Down With Foreseeabilily! Of Thin Skulls and Res
cuers (1969) 47 Can. Bar Rev. 545.
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of this particular plaintiff amounted to contributory negligence, so
that instead of being denied compensation altogether his award should
have been reduced by twenty-five or fifty percent. If this technique
had been utilized, the court might have been able not only to reward
the rescuer, but also to penalize him by cutting his award. Of course,
it is always open to the court to hold that a rescue operation is so
absolutely stupid that the claimant should be denied recovery alto
gether, as would have been the case if the plaintiff could not swim or
if it was obvious to everybody that the person in the water was al
ready dead. In my view it is unwise to say that the mere flouting of
an order to stay below is so unforeseeable as to preclude the rescuer
from recovery, especially in the light of authority to the effect that
foreseeable consequences include intervening negligence,94 a viola
tion of transit company rules,95 theft of an article,96 and even sui
cide.97 The onus of showing that the rescuer was foolhardy rests upon
the defendant98 which is quite consistent with the ordinary principles
of contributory negligence. Moreover, this question is a jury question
and not one for the court.99 As might be expected, the courts have
not been too harsh in their evaluation of the conduct of the rescuer,
which is as it should be in all emergency cases.100

In conclusion, the courts are beginning to use tort law to encourage
rescuers and Good Samaritans. New duties to act are being created.
The standard of care demanded of rescuers is being diminished. Injured
rescuers are being compensated, even where they are partially to blame
for their loss. Enterprises are, therefore, being forewarned that not
only do they have to pay for damages caused to individuals en
dangered, but also to rescuers who come to their aid. Perhaps greater
care will be fostered by this rule. The loss distribution goals of tort
law are being served and costs are being spread to those engaged
in activities, or those who benefit from them rather than being
borne by the victims. In any event, there are fewer rescue situations
to-day where the law is out of step with current notions of morality,
which is something to be welcomed.

94 Supra, n. 76.

91 Harris v. T.T.C. (1967) S.C.R. 460.

94 Stansbie v. Troman [1948] 2 K.B. 48; Patten v. Silberschein [1936] 3 W.W.R. 169; Cf. Duce v. Rourke
(1951) 1 W.W.R. 305 (Alta.).

97 Pigney v. Pointers Transport Services Ltd. [1957] 1 W.W.R. 1121; Stadel v. Albertson [1954] 2 D.L.R. 328
(Sask.).

9" Supra, n. 74 at 244 (per Willmer L.J.).

99 Supra, n. 55 at 323 (per Strong J.); supra, n. 59.

100 Morgan v. Aylen [1942] 1 All E.R. 489.

